

PANCASILA IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY AS DĀR AL-AHDI WA AL-SYAHĀDAH

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Abstract

Pancasila has become an agreement as to the final form of state philosophy or ideology. Pancasila is considered a "middle way". Muhammadiyah, as an important actor in the process of formulating Pancasila, feels it is important to maintain Pancasila as the basis of the state. At the 47th Muhammadiyah congress in Makassar, 2015, Muhammadiyah decided to make Pancasila as Dār Al-Ahdi Wa Al-Syahādah. This paper examines the Pancasila Implementation Strategy as Dār Al-Ahdi Wa Al-Syahādah to provide solutions to the ideological and practical problems of Pancasila. There are many challenges facing Pancasila. Some are ideological and some are practical. The ideological challenges are relatively reduced as a result of the commitment of Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah to Pancasila. On the other hand, the practical challenges related to the implementation of Pancasila are even greater. For example, Pancasila has played a role in Indonesian economic policies in dealing with COVID-19, business monopolies and oligarchs, and eradicating corruption?. This study uses the Literature Review method for meta-analysis of data by reviewing several articles in national and international journals. The conclusion is that the Pancasila problem is more related to the implementation of the values contained in the Pancasila precepts. The very great values of Pancasila are not able to colour the life of the nation and state.

Keywords: *Dār Al-Ahdi Wa Al-Syahādah, Pancasila, "The Middle Way"*

INTRODUCTION

In the last eight years there have been ideological tensions. The debates and discourses related to Pancasila are back, which are quite heating up the atmosphere of the life of the nation and state. The debates that emerged were not much different from ideological debates in previous eras, namely between Islamic groups and nationalist groups.

The thing that makes a little difference, first, is that the issue is no longer about an Islamic state or a Pancasila state. Second, the Islamic groups which in the debates of the previous periods were always one voice, are now different. Islamic groups are divided, not to say divided. Some have turned to support a political stance that is in line with the nationalist group. The fight is different too. Again, a battle of jargon and claims to feel the most

Pancasilaist emerged. There are groups that feel themselves the most Pancasilaist while accusing other groups of not being Pancasilaists.

During this period, national political views were also born among religious organizations, including Muhammadiyah. These political views are not much different from the post-Pancasila single-principle political views. These political views were born from the fact that Pancasila as an ideology was judged to have been completed following the "agreement" on August 18, 1945. All components of the nation had agreed to accept Pancasila as the state ideology. The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 which reiterated the 1945 Constitution further emphasized and at the same time clarified the position of Pancasila as the state ideology (Al.Hamdi, 2016).

In its journey, at least since the era of the single principle of Pancasila, 1985 until today, Muhammadiyah has always emphasized and affirmed the position of Pancasila as the state ideology. Finally, Muhammadiyah through the 47th Muhammadiyah Congress in Makassar 2015 affirmed Pancasila as *Dār Al-Ahdi Wa Al-Syahādah* (Hidayat, 2016).

The positioning of Pancasila as the state ideology has been completed. What has not been completed is the implementation aspect. In society, the implementation of Pancasila is paradoxical, there is a disconnect between *das sollen* (supposedly) and *das sein* (in fact). This disconnect is due to the low political will and political act of the state and other components of the nation in implementing Pancasila, as well as stuttering and misunderstanding (?) of Pancasila, both in the historical and conceptual contexts, but of course it cannot be ruled out that the clash of ideologies is latent and at the same time manifest between Islamic groups and nationalist groups, and the strengthening of Islamophobia as well as the ruling and engulfing political oligarchy in Indonesia.

Departing from the above background, this paper attempts to describe the formulation process as well as to explain the position of Pancasila as the state ideology. This paper also tries to offer an implementable solution to Pancasila in the context of the life of the nation and state.

The problem of Pancasila is no longer in the realm of ideological debate regarding the "feasibility" of Pancasila as the state ideology, as happened before and some time after independence, but rather on the issue of implementing the fundamental values of Pancasila in the life of the nation and state. In this context, Pancasila is almost not presented. Pancasila is just a jargon, a slogan, which in many ways tends to be absurd.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses the Literature Review method meta-analysis of data by reviewing several articles in national and international journals. The instrument used in this research is Pancasila. Data collection techniques in this study used documentation techniques from national, international journals and books related to the theme. The data analysis technique used descriptive qualitative.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Formulation of Pancasila

The agreement of Pancasila as the state ideology was not obtained in an easy way, but through a tortuous journey. There was a long dialectic since the trial at the Investigative Agency for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPK), the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) to the Constituent Assembly which culminated in the issuance of a Presidential Decree on July 5 1959, which contained a reaffirmation of the 1945 Constitution and called the Jakarta Charter an inspiration to the 1945 Constitution. .

History says that several months before Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies, Japan had promised to give independence to Indonesia. This promise was marked by the establishment of the BPUPK on April 29, 1945. (Kompas, 2009) During its establishment, the BPUPK was recorded to have held two official trials, including the trial from May 29 to June 1, 1945, which discussed the form of the state, state philosophy, and the basis of the state. (Minutes of BPUPK)

This trial was attended by the founders of the nation, both from Islamic groups and nationalist groups. On May 29, 1945, Mohammad Yamin gave a speech proposing the basic concept of the state by referring to national history, and the opinions of western thinkers. This trial succeeded in agreeing on the form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The agenda for the next session was to discuss the basis of the state. The first trial heard Mohammad Yamin's speech on the formulation of the five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia: Nationality; Fairy of Humanity; Fairy Godhead; Folk Fairy; and People's Welfare.

On May 31, 1945, Soepomo gave a speech conveying the idea of five basic principles of the state: "The Foundation of an Independent Indonesian State": Unity, Family, Consensus and Democracy, Deliberation, and Social Justice. And on June 1, 1945, Soekarno gave a speech putting forward the idea of the five basic principles of the state, named "Pancasila": Indonesian Nationality, Internationalism and Humanity, Consensus or Democracy, Social Welfare, and Belief in One God. (Soekarno's speech ended the trial period for the BPUPK. After that, the BPUPK went into recess for more than a month. However, before the recess, a small committee called the "Panitia Nine" was formed (Boland, 1985). This committee was tasked with discussing the inputs that had previously been put forward at the BPUPK session.

At these BPUPK and PPKI trials, several figures from Islamic groups offered many ideas regarding the state to be formed. Unfortunately, the ideas offered by these Islamic leaders are not well documented. Practically only the speech of the Chairman of the Executive Board (now the Central Executive) of Muhammadiyah, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, who gave a speech at the second trial, May 31, 1945, which notes were found. Meanwhile, the thoughts of other Islamic figures are practically not well documented.

On the occasion of his speech at the BPUPK trial, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo among others stated:

“Esteemed gentlemen and congregation! In our country, gentlemen, surely you want the establishment of a just and wise government, based on noble character, based on deliberation and meeting decisions, and broad-minded not forcing religion. If that is true, then establish a government over the religion of Islam, because the teachings of Islam contain these qualities.”

In another part of his speech, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo stated:

"With these short verses, it would be enough to know that Islam is capable and sufficient and proper and proper to be the foundation of the national government in our country, Indonesia. But among the gentlemen there are also those who disagree with our country based on religion.”

At the end of his speech, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo said:

“Therefore, gentlemen, I am a genuine Indonesian, my father and mother are Indonesian, my ancestors were Indonesians who were original and pure without any mixture; and as a Muslim who has the ideals of a Greater and Independent Indonesia, so that an independent Indonesian state can stand tall and firm, strong and firm, I hope that an Indonesian state will be founded on the basis of Islam. Because, that is in accordance with the state of the soul of the majority of the people, as I have explained earlier. Don't let the soul that 90 percent of the people be ignored and ignored. I am worried that if the Indonesian state does not stand on the religion of Islam, lest the majority of Muslims will be passive or cold and dispirited: as feared by Mr. Kiai Sanusi earlier. But I hope that doesn't happen. Gentlemen, many speakers have said that Islam is indeed high and holy. Now what if people who don't want to be bound by a religion that has been recognized as highly sacred, will they want to be bound by a low and impure mind? If the human soul does not want to submit to the religion of Allah's commandments, will it like to submit to the orders of the mind that arise from bad desires? Think and keep it in mind, gentlemen." would you want to be bound by a low and unholy mind? If the human soul does not want to submit to the religion of Allah's commandments, will it like to submit to the orders of the mind that arise from bad desires? Think and keep it in mind, gentlemen." would you want to be bound by a low and unholy mind? If the human soul does not want to submit to the religion of Allah's commandments, will it like to submit to the orders of the mind that arise from bad desires? Think and keep it in mind, gentlemen.”

For decades, the transcript of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo's speech has never been revealed in political talks and state affairs. Likewise speeches other Islamic figures. Of course, it would be very strange if so many Islamic leaders who were members of the BPUPK and PPKI did not give advice at all in this very important trial.

Until now, there has been no in-depth and comprehensive investigation into the disappearance of several important files related to the BPUPK and PPKI trials (Suryanegara, 2015) especially those related to speeches by Islamic figures. Ahmad Mansyur Suryanegara suspects that there is a deliberate factor from several parties to embezzle the roles and services of Islamic leaders. This strong allegation of embezzlement of history was carried out by several founding figures of the nation, with the aim that the founding fathers of Islamic figures did not seem to have contributed to the thought in the formulation of the basic state of Indonesia.

BPUPKI was disbanded on August 7, 1945, then PPKI was formed. Following the establishment of the PPKI, various political events took place that influenced the Indonesian independence process. On August 14, 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allies. On the same day Sutan Sjahrir urged Sukarno to proclaim the independence of Indonesia. The goal is that Indonesia's independence is not labeled as a "gift" from Japan. However, Soekarno was unwilling and stated that he was bound by the PPKI he chaired and felt the need to ask the Gunseikanbu for information regarding the news of the Japanese surrender (A. H. Nasution, 1979).

Seeing Soekarno's behavior, a group of youths led by Chaerul Saleh met in East Pegangsaan to discuss the attitude that must be taken to accelerate independence. They met Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta and urged them to immediately proclaim independence. Soekarno reacted strongly, that he was willing to be killed if the youths continued to impose their will. On August 16, 1945, these youths "kidnapped" Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta to Rengasdengklok with the intention of keeping them away from Japanese influence (Noer, 1984).

On August 17, 1945, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia at Pegangsaan Timur 56 Jakarta. With this proclamation, Indonesia officially became an independent country. Normally an independent country, it takes several requirements. To complete the requirements, PPKI has prepared a draft constitution which was previously agreed by BPUPK. PPKI meeting was held on August 18, 1945, among others, to stipulate the Constitution.

The basic formulation of the state contained in the Jakarta Charter that had been agreed upon in the BPUPK session, turned out to be changed when it was about to be enacted as the Constitution. Changes occurred as a report from Nishijama received by Moh. Hatta, August 17, 1945, which brought a message of objection from Eastern Indonesia to the sentence in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution: "With the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents," which is considered discriminatory. They "threatened" to separate themselves from Indonesia if the clause was still included in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution (Syarif, 2016).

In response to the complaint, on the same day a meeting was held between Mohammad Hatta and Islamic figures, such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, Agus Salim, and Teuku Muhammad Hasan, which resulted in a "political compromise" which fundamentally changed the contents of the Jakarta Charter from "God with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents" becomes "Godhead in One God" (Ma'arif, 2018). This political event can be viewed from two perspectives. First, it describes the great spirit of the Islamic group. Changes in the contents of the Jakarta Charter are burdensome for Islamic groups (Saifullah, 1997), because what must be changed are things that are seen as principles. In the view of Islamic groups, there is a theological belief that Islam is *al-dn wa al-dawlah*, Islam is a religion and a state. This means that Islam and the state are inseparable.

Second, the change in the contents of the Jakarta Charter cannot be understood as the absence of common ground between Islamic groups and nationalist groups regarding the basis of the state. On the contrary, the approval of the Jakarta Charter is a sign of the meeting of

two mainstream groups and strengthens the meeting point between Islamic groups and nationalist groups. Einar Martahan Sitompul considered that the events of August 18, 1945 emphasized the unique relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia, namely as not a theocratic state but also not a secular state from an ideological perspective.

The basic problems of the state re-emerged in the Constituent Assembly sessions which were intended to discuss the Constitution which was considered imperfect. In his capacity as Chairman of the PPKI, during a speech on August 18, 1945, Soekarno stated:

"The current constitution made is a provisional constitution. If I may use the words, this is the quickest Constitution. Later, when we are a state, in a more peaceful atmosphere, we will certainly reassemble the People's Consultative Assembly which can make a more complete and more complete constitution. Gentlemen, of course, understand that this is just a temporary constitution, a quick constitution, that perhaps it can be said that this is a *grondwet* revolution. Later we will make a more perfect and complete Constitution."

As is known, the Constituent Assembly was inaugurated by Soekarno, 10 November 1956. In his opening speech, Soekarno explained the provisional nature of the 1945 Constitution:

"It's not that we don't have a constitution, but with the current constitution, we already have three constitutions. But all constitutions are temporary. And all these constitutions are not the result of deliberation between the members of a constituency that is directly elected by the people in free and secret elections. All the constitutions were made by constitutional scholars, on the mandate of the government. But all democratic rule of law states want as an absolute condition a constitution made by the people themselves..." (A. B. Nasution, 2001)

Sukarno continued:

"In accordance with the meaning of people's sovereignty, or a democratic state, now is the time, dear representatives of the Indonesian people, who were democratically elected through the general election (1955), to make a Constitution that is as beautiful as possible, which contains the pearls of human rights. the most beautiful human being."

The Constituent Assembly consists of 514 people. Wilopo (PNI) is the chairman, with five vice-chairs: Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Masyumi), Fatchurrahman Kafrawi (NU), Johannes Leimena (Parkindo), Sakirman (PKI), and Hidayat Ratu Aminah (IPKI). There were several trial periods, including the second trial, which discussed the main issues that would be included in the new Constitution (20 May-7 June 1957) and the systematics of the Constitution (11-13 June 1957). In this second trial, there were two main topics of discussion that were considered important, namely the basis of the state and human rights.

From 11 November to 6 December 1957, there were three proposals related to the basis of the state, namely Pancasila, Islam, and socio-economic. Discussions related to the basis of the state were tough and tiring. So tough and tiring, that the plenary decided to temporarily suspend the discussion of the basic state.

At the 1958 trial, the Constituent Assembly formulated various draft articles to be drafted in the new Constitution. On September 11, 1958, when the trial period ended, Wilopo proudly said that the Constituent Assembly had succeeded in making many decisions. By the end of the 1958 session, the work of the Constituent Assembly had reached 90 percent. Because the discussion of the articles was almost over, during the first trial in 1959, the Constituent Assembly again discussed the Preamble of the Constitution. There is a basic state debate regarding whether the Seven Words contained in the Jakarta Charter will be recalled or not.

As in previous sessions, during the re-discussion of the Jakarta Charter, there was tension between the nationalist and Islamic groups. Soekarno himself requested that the Constituent Assembly be able to complete its duties on March 26, 1960. This request can be viewed from at least two perspectives. First, Soekarno was serious about discussing the constitution. Soekarno really hoped that the Constituent Assembly would be able to complete its duties in a plenary manner. Second, the request was nothing more than a warning that Sukarno wanted full power over him. After the 1955 General Election, Soekarno's power was practically only ceremonial, while the real power was with the Prime Minister. The emergence of this view is not too wrong, especially when it is associated with the strengthening of the military's "political appetite".

The second perspective was proven correct when Soekarno issued a decree on July 5 1959. At that time the Constituent Assembly had made an agenda to decide on the form of the state, the system of government, the preamble to the Constitution, and the principles of the state. Compromises that remained 10 percent finally no longer attempted. Meanwhile, the Seven Words offered by Soekarno as a compromise step also could not be a solution. The Islamic group stated that they were willing to return to the 1945 Constitution, but with a note that the Jakarta Charter was included in the Preamble and Article 29, as stated in the decision dated June 22, 1945. At the suggestion of the Islamic group, the nationalist groups closed their ranks. They were determined to accept the 1945 Constitution without any changes. Voting is a solution option. First voting, Friday 29 May 1959 to state whether or not to agree with the 1945 Constitution with the amendments proposed by Islamic groups,

However, because the pro-amendment votes did not reach 2/3 of the votes present and even lost, the amendment proposal was eventually cancelled. A similar fate was experienced by nationalist groups who supported the 1945 Constitution without any changes. For three days for three times the vote, the results are not enough to meet 2/3 of the vote. On Saturday, May 30 1959, 269 votes were voted in favor of 199 against. On Monday, June 1 1959, 264 people agreed while 204 refused. Meanwhile, in the voting on Tuesday, June 2, 1959, 263 people agreed and 203 rejected it. The meeting which determined the fate of the 1945 Constitution was finally closed on June 2, 1959 (Aj-Jahrani, 1996). During the trial the day before the recess, there were actually two voting opportunities. However, considering the previous results, Wilopo decided to end the plenary session.

The failure of the Constituent Assembly to reach an agreement regarding the Constitution was used as a justification for KSAD Major General. AH Nasution, who immediately issued the Perppu, contained a ban on political activities. The country was declared in a state of emergency of war. The Constituent Assembly is also prohibited from carrying out political

activities. Some 18 parties reacted by passing resolutions not to attend the Constituent Assembly again after the recess (Murod, 2017).

Because the Constituent Assembly was considered a failure, Sukarno, supported by AH Nasution, issued a Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959. When the Decree was issued, the Constituent Assembly was in recess. The decree contained, first, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Second, return to the 1945 Constitution and the invalidation of the 1950 Constitution, and third, the establishment of the MPRS and DPAS. Through this decree, Soekarno succeeded in dissolving the Constituent Assembly and reinstating the 1945 Constitution. Since then, a new political era has begun, known as Guided Democracy (Budyanto, 2018).

Presidential Decree

By the grace of God Almighty

We are the President of the Republic of Indonesia / Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Hereby solemnly declare:

Whereas the recommendation by the President and the Government to return to the 1945 Constitution which was conveyed to all Indonesian people with the mandate of the President on 22 April 1959 did not obtain a decision from the Constituent Assembly as stipulated in the Provisional Constitution;

That is in connection with the statement by most of the members of the Constitutional Assembly that they no longer attend the trial. It is no longer possible for the Constituent Assembly to complete the tasks entrusted to it by the people;

Whereas this creates a state of affairs that endangers the unity and safety of the State, Nusa and the Nation, as well as hinders universal development to achieve a just and prosperous society;

Whereas with the support of the majority of the Indonesian people and driven by our own beliefs, we are forced to take the only way to save the State of the Proclamation;

Whereas we believe that the Jakarta Charter dated June 22, 1945 animates the 1945 Constitution and is an integral part of the Constitution:

So, on the basis of the above,

WE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA / THE HIGHEST COMMANDMENT OF THE ARMY SET FORTH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

To stipulate that the 1945 Constitution shall be valid again for the entire Indonesian nation and for the entire homeland of Indonesia as of the date of the stipulation of this decree and the Provisional Constitution shall no longer come into force.

The establishment of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, consisting of members of the People's Representative Council plus representatives from the regions and groups as well as the establishment of the Provisional Supreme Advisory Council will be held in the shortest possible time.

Set in Jakarta

On July 5 1959

On behalf of the Indonesian people

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA/SUPREME COMMANDMENT OF THE ARMY

SOEKARNO

There were several events that prompted Sukarno to issue a decree. First, the failure of the Constituent Assembly in enacting the Constitution. Second, the holding of the General Elections on September 29, 1955 (electing members of the DPR) and December 15, 1955 (electing the Constituent Assembly) was not able to overcome political instability. Third, members of the DPR consisting of dozens of representatives of political parties are divided into various ideologies that are difficult to unite. Fourth, regardless of whether they are mobilized or not, the facts in society are reflected in the demonstrations demanding the re-enactment of the 1945 Constitution (Soekarno, 2001).

Pancasila as Dar al-Ahd wal al-Shahadah

Muhammadiyah views that the Pancasila state is a national consensus and a place of proof or testimony. Dar al-ahdi is an affirmation that Indonesia was born because of the willingness among the founding fathers of the nation to accept the entire plurality of the nation. Not only a consensus, the Pancasila state is also a Dar al-Shahadah or "state of testimony" or "a treaty state".

After agreeing to establish Indonesia with the ideology of Pancasila, all elements of the nation must fill it in order to become a safe and peaceful country towards an advanced, just, prosperous, dignified, and sovereign life in the shade of the pleasure of Allah swt.

Muhammadiyah feels it is important to always affirm its position on Pancasila. In Muhammadiyah's view, Pancasila is in accordance with Islamic values and is a meeting point for all components of the nation (Harun, 1986). In addition, historical facts, Muhammadiyah plays an important role in making the final formulation of Pancasila as the basis of the state. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, then Chairman of PB Muhammadiyah, with his wisdom turned the tension about the Jakarta Charter into a common consensus, by changing the "Seven Words" in the Jakarta Charter to only Belief in One God. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo's legowo attitude can also be interpreted as an affirmation of Muhammadiyah's middle attitude (tawasuth) which does not tend to one extreme pole, either conservative who wants an Islamic state, or a secular-liberal state.

As an important element in formulating state ideology, Muhammadiyah needs to reaffirm its position on the Pancasila state. This affirmation is important in line with the tendency to strengthen state behavior and practices which are clearly contrary to Pancasila (Notonagoro, 1975). In addition to the problem of separatism, the strengthening of religious extremism, as well as acute deviations in state practice, which is illustrated by the fragile sense of nationalism in some Indonesians, including the political elite, weak law enforcement where the law is only sharp downwards and blunt upwards, high the number of economic crimes and abuse of power, which is at least illustrated by the high number of corruption.

By affirming that Pancasila is *Dar al-Ahdi wa al-Shahadah*, Muhammadiyah wants to invite all elements of the nation to rest on the basic principle that this country is a state that belongs to all the Indonesian people, not to just one group, and therefore must be built, saved, and protected. and cannot be tampered with (Pour, 2009).

Implementation Strategy

Talking about strategy means talking about a comprehensive approach with regard to any implementation, including the implementation of strategies to implement an idea. In the context of implementing Pancasila as *Dār Al-Ahdi wa Al-Syahādah*, a comprehensive strategy is also needed, not partial. There are several strategies that can be done to implement Pancasila as *Dār Al-Ahdi wa Al-Syahādah*.

1. Stop the Jargonization of Pancasila.

Pancasila, which is now widely known by the public, has been agreed upon as the basis of the state since August 18, 1945. This means that since that date – especially in line with the issuance of the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 which reaffirmed the 1945 Constitution – until now Indonesia has adopted the ideology of Pancasila. However, the way to position and treat Pancasila is very varied (Saleh, 1996).

During the Old Order, there were relatively no problems with the ideology of Pancasila. The jargonization of Pancasila as the state ideology did not occur. The shouts of Pancasila and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia as fixed prices are not as loud as what has happened in recent years. Islamic parties, including Muhammadiyah and NU, have even supported a change in the shape of the state: the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia into a federal state: the United States of Indonesia (RIS, December 1949-September 1950), something that is definitely considered taboo in the current context. In this RIS Cabinet, Muhammadiyah and NU each get one ministerial quota.

Efforts to impoverish Pancasila according to the tastes of the authorities also relatively did not happen. In the post-Presidential Decree of July 5 1959, the political idioms or jargons used by Soekarno almost never mentioned and dragged Pancasila. Soekarno preferred to mention Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism), not for example Pancakom (Pancasila, Religion, and Communism). Soekarno prefers to call Guided Democracy rather than Pancasila Democracy (Sitompul, 1986).

The Old Order rulers only required social organizations or political parties to accept and defend Pancasila and not as a principle that had to be written down textually. So that mass organizations and political parties that existed during the Old Order were basically the same as when the mass organizations and political parties were founded. The Catholic Party, for example, is based on the belief in One God in general and Pancasila in particular and acts according to Catholic principles. Likewise, Parkindo is based on Christianity. NU and other Islamic parties are based on Islam and the PNI is still based on Marhaenism.

Entering the New Order era, there was a paradox with the Old Order in positioning Pancasila. While the Old Order positioned Pancasila as described above, this was not the case with the New Order, which was in fact very political in positioning Pancasila. Pancasila was perfectly successfully "used" as a political jargon by the New Order regime. Pancasila was used as a political weapon to kill and get rid of Suharto's political opponents. Pancasila – of course, according to the interpretation of the authorities – has been successfully used as an instrument to weaken Islamic politics, which is illustrated by the ideology of Pancasila as the single principle. Under the pretext of a single principle, Suharto managed to tame and marginalize the political forces within the Muslim community (Suryanegara, 2015).

The idea to make Pancasila the sole principle began when President Suharto delivered a state speech, August 16, 1982 in front of members of the DPR. Regardless of the motive behind President Suharto's State of the Union speech, he explained that the contents of this State Speech had provoked the public to take a stand. The attitude that emerged at that time was someone who fully agreed and immediately accepted it. On the other hand, there are those who vehemently reject it. Some receive it covertly and cautiously. And there are also those who take a silent stance.

The United Development Party (PPP) chose Mauquf. This is understandable, because if you accept a single principle, you seem to admit, first, religion (Islam), as if it had caused chaos in the past, at least it is contrary to Pancasila. Second, Suharto's indications in his State Speech suggest that the chaos (violence) during the 1982 election campaign was indeed caused by the PPP which still uses Islamic principles. There are Islamic mass organizations who are against it, as shown by PII and HMI. Some are cautious like Muhammadiyah. Through Tanwir 1983, Muhammadiyah made several important decisions regarding the single principle. Among other things, Muhammadiyah agreed that Pancasila should be included in the Muhammadiyah's Articles of Association without changing the existing Islamic principles. Other decisions, that further discussion of the single principle will be discussed at the Surakarta Congress, December 1985. At this congress, Muhammadiyah officially accepted the single principle of Pancasila. NU was one of the first mass organizations to accept the single principle of Pancasila long before the Ormas Law was passed. This incident occurred during the Alim Ulama National Conference in Situbondo, 1983. One of the decisions was the acceptance of NU for the single principle of Pancasila. This decision was strengthened by the decision of the 27th NU Congress, 1984 at the same place. One of the decisions was NU's acceptance of the single principle of Pancasila. This decision was strengthened by the decision of the 27th NU Congress, 1984 at the same place. One of the decisions was NU's acceptance of the single principle of Pancasila. This decision was strengthened by the decision of the 27th NU Congress, 1984 at the same place (Thaba, 1996).

As the anti-thesis of the New Order, the ideological face of the Reformation era – at least up to the era of the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) – was entirely contradictory to the New Order. In this era, Pancasila is rarely used as a political jargon. Efforts to ideologically Pancasila almost did not happen. From the leadership of the Habibie era to SBY, he never used Pancasila to frighten his political opponents. On the other hand, Suharto-era prisoners were released. Never was Pancasila used as an instrument to accuse other groups of not being or lacking in Pancasila. Pancasila is truly placed honorably as the state ideology, certainly not in the context of implementation(Zhang et al., 2019).

In the last decade, the position of Pancasila has only become a jargon, a divisive jargon. It is used as an instrument to create ideological polarization between the group that feels the most NKRI and Pancasilaist and the "accused group" who is considered anti-NKRI and a-Pancasilais. Accusing other groups of being a-Pancasilais, radicals, and intolerance. On the other hand, they think that their group is the most Pancasilais, moderate, and tolerant haphazardly. Everything was done under the pretext of Pancasila. There was ideological tension. This is the reality of Pancasila in the last decade.

This condition is reminiscent of the atmosphere from the beginning until the mid-1980s, when the New Order regime with all its political power forced Pancasila as the sole principle. This ideological atmosphere repeats itself, even worse. If the tensions that emerged in the New Order era were purely ideological tensions involving the state vis a vis civil society, it was illustrated by the birth of a civil society that was very critical of the state(Hidayat, 2016).

While the current tension is deliberately "created", there is an ideological engineering, as if there is an ideological tension between a group that claims to support Pancasila and a group accused of being anti-Pancasila. And this ideological tension is actually not (merely) ideological as in the New Order era, but there is an economic motive, where there is a giant economic power that has been controlling our economy all this time trying to grip it deeper by exploiting ideological issues that are indeed the most important. easy to create in society.

Pancasila, which is actually final as a state ideology, is engineered as if there are and large numbers of them reject Pancasila. Researches on Pancasila, the theme of which always clashes Pancasila with Islam, which in the last seven years has been so widespread, also seems to be engineered in such a way. The results of these surveys always over-expose the very small percentage that he says rejects Pancasila compared to exposing the very large percentage of Muslims who support Pancasila as the state ideology. As if in congregation, the conclusions of these surveys always tend to corner Muslims as intolerant, radical, and anti-Pancasila(Al-Hamdi, 2015).

The survey results of the following three institutions illustrate this at least. First, the results of a survey conducted by the Wahid Institute, which mentions the increasing trend of intolerance and radicalism in Indonesia. From the results of the Wahid Institute study, there are around 0.4% or around 600,000 Indonesian citizens (WNI) who have taken radical actions. The data is calculated based on the adult population, around 150 million people. There are also groups of people who are prone to be affected by radical movements, which can carry out radical movements if invited or given the opportunity, the number is around 11.4 million

people or 7.1%. Meanwhile, intolerance in Indonesia also tends to increase from the previous 46% to 54%.

Second, research conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI). The results of this research show that public intolerance in the first period of President Joko Widodo's administration is still quite high. The survey was carried out on 8-17 September 2019 with 1,550 respondents. The margin of error of the study is approximately 2.5 percent with a 95 percent confidence level. The survey was conducted by face-to-face interviews. The LSI survey states that there has been no real effort from the government to improve religious and political intolerance.

The LSI survey stated that 59.1 percent of Muslim respondents were intolerant or objected to non-Muslims becoming president. Then, 56.1 percent of non-Muslims objected to being vice president, 52 percent objected to non-Muslims becoming governors, and 51.6 percent of non-Muslims objecting to becoming regents/mayors. There are also 53 percent of Muslims who object if non-Muslims build places of worship around their homes. A total of 36.8 percent did not mind.

LSI said that the trend of political intolerance had increased since Jokowi was elected. Based on LSI data, Muslims are increasingly intolerant of non-Muslims in terms of politics, for example becoming government leaders in the last four years. Religious-cultural intolerance has tended to decrease since 2010, but this decline stopped in 2017. After 2017, religious-cultural intolerance tends to increase, especially in terms of building houses of worship.

Third, the Setara Institute research showed similar results, where the most common types of violations against freedom of religion and belief (KBB) in 2020 were acts of intolerance. Many of these acts of intolerance are carried out by non-state actors, such as citizen groups, individuals, religious organizations, to the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). The act of violating the KBB by non-state actors is intolerance with 62 cases. Furthermore, the Setara Institute recorded 32 cases related to reporting blasphemy, 17 cases of refusal to establish a place of worship, and 8 cases of prohibiting worship activities. Then, 6 cases of destruction of places of worship, 5 cases of rejection of activities and 5 cases of violence.

Institutions such as the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP) were created with unclear works. Its existence seems limited to strengthening the state in adopting Pancasila, whose interpretation and practice often collide with the philosophical values of Pancasila which were (formerly) formulated by the founding fathers of the nation (Al-Barbasy, 2018).

These tensions will always occur when Pancasila is just a jargon without serious efforts to ground the fundamental values of Pancasila. When the elite of this country does not seriously try to present Pancasila as the spirit when it was agreed to become the state ideology, on August 18, 1945, then Pancasila will never mean anything to the Indonesian nation and state. Pancasila will forever only be a jargon.

So it's time to end the jargonization of Pancasila. The problem of Pancasila is no longer ideological, but in the implementation of its values. Pancasila as an ideology is finished. When

the jargon of Pancasila continues to be echoed, it actually shows that Pancasila as an ideology is considered unfinished. And this seems to be deliberately done by the current regime.

2. Build Common Understanding

Ideological agreements have often been made, but they are often violated. There is a kind of unethical behavior among the children of this nation towards the ideological agreements that have been made and mutually agreed upon. On June 22, 1945 all of the founding fathers of this nation had agreed with the Jakarta Charter as the Great Agreement (Mitsaqan Ghaliza), but then challenged it only a few months after the agreement, or to be precise, a few hours after the declaration of Indonesia's independence, 17 August 1945, namely by changing some things that are considered Islamic.

In addition to the changes in the Seven Words: Belief in God by implementing Islamic law for its adherents, which is contained in the First Precepts of Pancasila and Article 29 Paragraph 1 which originally read: "The state is based on God by implementing Islamic law for its adherents" to only "God Almighty". Esa" there is also a change in Article 6 Paragraph (1) which reads that the President of Indonesia is a native Indonesian and a Muslim converts to "The President is a native Indonesian".

When this nation had agreed with the Pancasila which was agreed upon at PPKI on August 18, 1945, this agreement was again weakened along with the issuance of the Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959. In the text of this decree – as mentioned above – it is stated: That we believe that the Jakarta Charter is dated 22 June 1945 animates the 1945 Constitution and is an integral part of the Constitution. The mention of the Jakarta Charter in the contents of this Presidential Decree certainly reminds Islamic groups of the slick agreement dated June 22, 1945.

This Presidential Decree has never been revoked, and it is the same as an affirmation that the current 1945 Constitution is a constitution which still believes in the Jakarta Charter to animate and become a series of units.

Now, after the lawsuit against Pancasila as the state ideology is no longer a mainstream issue, this nation should have a commitment to seriously implement the values contained in the Pancasila precepts. This commitment must be a "new understanding" among the nation's children. Because the current problem of Pancasila is no longer ideological in nature, but rather an implementation problem. Not one bit seen among the children of this nation, especially those who are currently in power, have a commitment to implement the values of Pancasila seriously.

3. Win Mainstream Understanding

Pancasila is the result of a long dialectic between the extremities of perspectives on philosophy or ideology that existed at the time of independence until now. It is often referred to as a wasathiyah synthesis of two ideological extremes: capitalism and communism or theocratic and secularistic. For those who view it theologically, Pancasila is considered a philosophy or ideology that is very religious (Subaidi, 2020), in line with the fundamental values

in Islam: divinity (tawhid), humanity and civility, love for the homeland (hubbul wathan), deliberation (shura), and justice. (al-'is).

Pancasila is an affirmation of Indonesia, namely an affirmation that Indonesia is not a religious state" (of course what is meant is Islam), but also not a secular state as in the West. Indonesia is a country (Pancasila) that places religion in an important and fundamental position. This affirmation is contained in the First Precepts of Pancasila, the Preamble, and Article 29 Paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

The First Precept of Pancasila firmly mentions Belief in One Supreme God. According to Notonagoro, the fundamental message of the Precept of the One Godhead is the compatibility of the nature and nature of the state with the nature of God. Conformity is in the sense of causality. So in all aspects of state administration, Indonesia must be run in accordance with the essence of values that come from God, namely religious values (Al.Hamdi, 2016).

Likewise, Article 29 Paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution, is an affirmation of the first principle. Article 29 Paragraph 1 states that the State is based on the One Supreme Godhead. The mention of the word "state" can be understood that the state is a subject whose duty is to "present" God in the life of the state and society. Of course, "presenting" God in this context is more about the values or teachings of God contained in the holy books.

In other words, the mention of the two highest legal bases, namely Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the very fundamental position of God, actually the founders of the nation wanted to emphasize that Indonesia is not a secular state, but also a religious (theocratic) state. Indonesia is a country that believes in God or a religious country, a country that requires state administrators, political elites, or anyone else, to base themselves on the values, teachings or principles of God (illahiyah). With this affirmation, the state is obliged to manage the state based on the teachings of God.

Strictly mentioning that the State is based on the One Godhead also at the same time expressly negates the forms of state which are held by denying God, such as an atheist state or a secular state, a state which strictly and rigidly separates religion and the state, a state which held with the despised God.

Indonesia's position as a country based on God Almighty should be positioned proportionally in the context of the life of the nation and state. Debates with an ideological dimension do not need to occur when the state is organized proportionally by referring to the basic principles of a state that is divine and by prioritizing democratic values, where legislation and government products are made and implemented based on the will of the people and the principles of God. as well as other basic values that exist in society(Priatmoko, 2018).

Because of the basic principles of the state, there should be no need for talkative discourse within the scope of state officials who try to deliberately violate the basic principles of the state which are based on God in One Supreme God. Discourses such as the abolition of Law Number 1/PNPS/1965 concerning Blasphemy of Religion, the abolition of the religion column in the ID card, the abolition of the Ministry of Religion, the abolition of the Decree of 2 Ministers regarding the establishment of places of worship, including efforts to support and

legalize LGBT, are actually reflections of officials who are stuttering and unable to understand properly the basic principles of the state which are based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Because with this discourse, they are actually trying to obscure the basic principles of the Indonesian state which believe in the one and only God by trying to drag Indonesia towards the face of a secularistic state, an effort that is certainly contrary to Pancasila. And this effort will continue to be carried out by parties who want to destroy peace and harmony in Indonesia (AL-BARBASY, 2016).

With this basic principle, the state cannot be run pragmatically, merely fulfilling the will and other interests outside the interests of the state, which are not in line and diametrically opposed to the basic principles of the Indonesian state as a state based on the One Godhead.

For those who understand Pancasila well and completely, such an understanding of Pancasila feels very proportional, and should become a mainstream understanding among the nation's children.

4. Understand the Political Elite about Pancasila

Pancasila is a middle philosophy or ideology (*wasathiyah*), which is not at an extreme point (*tatharruf* or *ghuluw*). The middle face of Pancasila should be well implemented in all lines of people's lives, including the political elites of policy makers. The middle face of Pancasila should be reflected in policies in the political field. Our political policies should be made in line with the philosophy or values contained in Pancasila. Our political policies should start from the spirit of the people. However, democracy in the context of Pancasila must be led by wisdom (*wisdom*), whose value position is far above policy (*policy*) and by upholding the principles of deliberation.

Look at our political policies. Don't move to the middle. What happened was a movement that led to policy-making towards extremes (*tatharruf*), which of course contradicted Pancasila. All types of elections take place in person. The determination of candidates for legislative members uses a very liberal mechanism, namely by majority vote. The MPR as the mandate of the founding fathers of the nation was intended as an institution tasked with choosing national leaders, since the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, its function has been dwarfed in such a way. The MPR, which was originally positioned as the highest state institution, now has an equal status with the DPR, DPD, and several other institutions, namely as a state institution.

In the economic field, Pancasila mandates the application of the economic principles of Pancasila which upholds *gotong royong* and joint efforts, but in practice, our economy is very far from the economic principles of Pancasila. Our economy is very capitalistic, something that is certainly contrary to Pancasila. Meanwhile, all policies relating to politics and the economy are made by policy makers. The law is made by the DPR in collaboration with the President. Of course these practices become very absurd. In this section, you can part the explanation using subheadings as you can see down below (Priatmoko, 2018). The implementation of Pancasila is still half-hearted in Indonesia, as seen in the government's policies during the COVID-19 pandemic, which instead focused on helping large corporations and high-income groups. As stated by the Executive Director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies

(CELIOS), Bhima Yudhistira, of the total tax expenditure, especially tax incentives, corporations enjoy a reduction in corporate income tax rates, and the rich enjoy a 0 percent PPNBM for buying new cars. Inequality policies for the group of 40 percent of expenditures and below, whose aid often overlaps and problematic aid data (*Implementasi Pancasila Dalam Kebijakan Ekonomi Masih Setengah Hati*, n.d.). Inequality in Indonesia: From the Central Statistics Agency's 2000 data, the Gini ratio was 0.3, then in 2021, it reached 0.38.

CONCLUSION

Pancasila is the final form of state philosophy or ideology. It is full of twists and turns to agree on Pancasila as the philosophy or ideology of the state. The approval of Pancasila as the philosophy or ideology of the state, because it is considered a "middle way" option between two extreme points (tatharruf), namely between theocracy and secularism.

Even though it has become a collective agreement as the philosophy or ideology of the state, the lawsuit against Pancasila which is ideological in nature is still happening even though the quantity is starting to weaken and soften. It is marked, for example, that the will of a small part of the community still appears to be obsessed with presenting an ideology other than Pancasila.

As an organization involved in the formulation of Pancasila, it is important for Muhammadiyah to guard, strengthen, and affirm Pancasila as the philosophy or ideology of the state. Through the 2015 Makassar Congress, Muhammadiyah made an organizational decision calling Pancasila as Dār Al-Ahdi Wa Al-Syahādah. The decision of this organization is nothing more than to strengthen the ideological position of Pancasila.

The problem of Pancasila today is no longer ideological in nature, as it appeared during the debates at the BPUPK, PPKI, Konstituante to the single principle of Pancasila. The Pancasila problem is more related to the implementation of the values contained in the Pancasila precepts. The very great values of Pancasila are not able to color the life of the nation and state. This problem must be answered by inviting all the nation's children to implement the values of Pancasila.

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